Clouds Connected · Case study
Delivery studyAerospace & defence

221 of 222 project schedules moved off an out-of-support Project Server for an aerospace manufacturer, on an engagement scoped at one project that turned out to be 300.

A Project Server 2013 to Project Online migration scoped against one project, which became 35, then roughly 250, and finally 300 live projects with about 1,500 more identified for archive.

Client
Canadian aerospace manufacturer
Sector
Aerospace & defence
Engagement
Project Server 2013 → Project Online migration
Period
September 2022 – March 2023
Anonymised

The client is anonymised, and every figure on this page traces to dated project correspondence. Quotes are verbatim, with their clearance status shown against each one. Named references are available on request. Nothing here has been estimated or rounded up.

In brief

Project Server to Project Online migration: what this engagement covered

The challenge

The manufacturer’s project management office ran on Project Server 2013: on-premises, out of support, and holding the schedules for engineering programmes measured in years.

The engagement was scoped against one project. That was not carelessness, it was what the discovery found, because the PMO’s own view of what was live had drifted from what the server actually held. As the migration approached, the number moved to 35, then to roughly 250, and by the time content was moving it stood at 300 live projects with a further 1,500 or so identified for archive.

A scope change of that size sends a migration wrong in one of two ways: the supplier absorbs it quietly and delivers late, or the work stops while commercial conversations happen and the date is lost. The client had already replanned once, moving cutover and go-live from February to March.

The solution

The scope change was documented and priced, not absorbed. A change request set out the movement from 1 to roughly 250 projects with the additional effort costed at 120 hours, and went to the client for approval, so the PMO could decide knowingly about a migration whose size had changed underneath everyone.

The migration tool’s failure mode was engineered around rather than escalated. The first three attempts failed: FluentBooks leaked resources across long runs, degrading until it stalled. The run was restructured into batches of five, with a forced restart of Project between batches and the ten largest projects handled individually, where one failure would otherwise cost a whole batch. The fourth attempt produced 142 projects in about 24 hours.

Reconciliation ran against the source system, not the migration list. Schedules saved but never published do not appear in the reporting database that migration lists are built from, and in a PMO an unpublished schedule is often the one someone is actively working on. An extract by modification date across the preceding four months was pulled to catch them, and the go-live list checked against it.

What would not be there on day one was said out loud. Ahead of the related intranet cutover the client was told plainly that Power Automate was out of scope and would not exist at go-live, and that the legacy 2010 workflows would keep running but without Microsoft support.

The results

221 of 222projects migrated into Project Online, with the single failure named and scheduled
142projects migrated in about 24 hours on the fourth run, after three failed attempts
120 hoursthe costed change request raised when the scope moved from one project to roughly 250
10content databases moved across the associated SharePoint 2013 to 2016 leg
DimensionBeforeAfter
PlatformProject Server 2013, on-premises and out of supportProject Online
Known scopeone project300 live projects, plus 1,500 or so identified for archive
Migration runthree failed attempts, the tool degrading across long runsbatches of five with a forced restart between them: 142 projects in about 24 hours
What the PMO knew it hada count from the last time anyone counteda live-project list reconciled against the source system

The PMO stopped running its programme schedules on an out-of-support platform and, more useful day to day, acquired an accurate picture of what it actually had: a live-project list reconciled against the server rather than the last time anyone counted.

The one project that did not migrate cleanly was reported as exactly that, with a commitment to resolve it the following week. On a 222-project migration that sentence is worth more than the 221.

Technologies

Questions we get asked

Project Server to Project Online migration: common questions

How do you handle a large scope change mid-migration?
Document and price it rather than absorbing it. The movement from 1 to roughly 250 projects here was raised as a change request with the additional effort costed at 120 hours and put to the client for approval, so the PMO could make an informed decision about a migration whose size had genuinely changed. Absorbing it quietly and delivering late, or stopping while commercial conversations happen and losing the date, were both live alternatives.
Why do FluentBooks migration runs fail on large Project Server estates?
Long runs leak resources and degrade until they stall. Three attempts failed here before the run was restructured around that failure mode rather than escalated: batches of five, a forced restart of Project between batches, and the ten largest projects handled individually so a single failure could not cost a whole batch. The fourth attempt produced 142 projects in about 24 hours.
How do you find Project Server schedules a migration list will miss?
Reconcile against the source system, not the migration list. Schedules saved but never published do not appear in the reporting database that migration lists are built from, and in a PMO an unpublished schedule is often the one someone is actively working on. An extract by modification date across the preceding four months was pulled specifically to catch them.
What should a client be told will be missing at go-live?
Whatever will actually be missing. Ahead of the related intranet cutover this client was told plainly that Power Automate was out of scope and would not exist at go-live, and that legacy 2010 workflows would keep running without Microsoft support. Naming a residual risk lets a client plan for it; discovering it afterwards makes it an incident.
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Two ways this usually starts

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SharePoint delivery under your paper

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Upgrades, migrations, recovery, patching

SharePoint Server and Microsoft 365 platform work on estates that cannot simply be rebuilt: version upgrades, tenant and content migrations, disaster recovery design and drills, performance root-cause diagnosis, and scheduled security patching on a standing cycle.

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Provenance

Where these facts come from

Reconstructed from project correspondence, September 2021 to September 2026. Every figure on this page traces to a dated message, and the source citation for each sits in the accompanying fact sheet. Nothing has been estimated, rounded up, or written on the client’s behalf.

Clouds ConnectedAerospace · Project Server to Project Online